The UK Supreme Court heard argument on 7 and 8 October 2026 in Farley v Paymaster (1836), a case that will decide whether people must show a “threshold of seriousness” before they can claim compensation for a data protection breach. It arrives against a striking backdrop. Complaints to the UK’s data protection watchdog, the Information Commission, rose from 42,300 in 2024/25 to more than 76,700 in 2025/26. James Hyde, a disputes partner at Addleshaw Goddard, says organisations are being “inundated with trivial data privacy related claims”, partly fuelled by claimants using AI to generate them, creating “a significant drain on business time and money”.

The facts of the case are mundane, which is exactly why it matters to ordinary businesses. More than 400 current and former Sussex Police officers sued after the force’s pension administrator, Paymaster (1836), trading as Equiniti, sent their annual benefits statements to old addresses — exposing dates of birth, National Insurance numbers, salaries and pension details. No hacker, no ransomware, no special category data. Just post sent to the wrong place, the most ordinary data protection failure there is. Equiniti calls it a “trivial, one–off breach”. The claimants, supported by the Open Rights Group and by the Information Commission itself, argue that a seriousness threshold would be inconsistent with GDPR and would shut out legitimate “mass harm” claims. The ruling has not yet been given, and the outcome is genuinely open. But one detail in the record deserves more attention than it has received: minutes from the Sussex Police Pension Board show two other separate occasions when statements went to the wrong address. Whatever the Supreme Court decides about trivial breaches, a pattern is a harder thing to call one–off.

76,700+

Data protection complaints to the Information Commission in 2025/26, up from 42,300 the year before

+81%

Rise in complaints in a single year, derived from the published figures — the backdrop to warnings of AI–fuelled trivial claims

400+

Current and former Sussex Police officers bringing the claim after benefits statements went to their old addresses

Occasions statements were misdirected, counting this one and the two others recorded in Sussex Police Pension Board minutes

What the Supreme Court is being asked to decide

The legal question is narrow to state and significant in effect. When personal data is mishandled, must a person show that the consequences reached some threshold of seriousness before they can recover compensation — or is any proven loss, including distress, enough in principle? A threshold would filter out claims where the harm is minimal. No threshold would leave those claims in play, to be dealt with on their merits and, typically, through modest awards.

The case’s procedural history shows how unsettled this has been. In February 2024 the High Court struck out most of the officers’ claims, because they could not prove that the envelopes had been opened or that their data had been misused. The Court of Appeal took a different view, ruling that the officers could still claim damages for the breach itself if they could show they were harmed — even without proven misuse. That shift, from “prove someone read it” to “prove you were harmed by the breach”, is what Equiniti is now asking the Supreme Court to revisit.

Equiniti’s argument is that this was a “trivial, one–off breach” which “cannot have given rise to genuine feelings of distress”. It points out that more than 90% of the affected officers did not sign up for the free fraud prevention service it offered — evidence, on its account, that the people concerned were not in fact worried.

The claimants’ argument, backed by the Open Rights Group and by the Information Commission, is that a seriousness threshold would be inconsistent with GDPR and would block legitimate claims in mass harm cases — where a single breach affects thousands of people and each individual’s loss is small, but the aggregate wrong is substantial. Without a route for such claims, the argument runs, an organisation that exposes the data of a large number of people a little bit each faces no meaningful private consequence at all.

That the regulator has sided with the claimants is notable and worth stating plainly. The body responsible for enforcing data protection in the UK is arguing against a filter that would reduce the number of claims businesses face. Whatever one thinks of the merits, it signals that the regulator does not regard a reduction in private claims as the right answer to rising complaint volumes.

A threshold, if there is one, protects the one–off mistake — not the repeated one

It is tempting to read this case as a potential reprieve: if the Supreme Court introduces a seriousness threshold, minor slip–ups stop costing money. That reading misses the most important fact in the record. Equiniti’s defence rests on the incident being trivial and one–off. Sussex Police Pension Board minutes record two other separate occasions on which annual benefits statements were sent to the wrong address — suggesting, in the brief’s words, a systemic rather than one–off failure in address management. Whatever the court decides about thresholds, the practical protection for a business is not a legal filter. It is being able to show that a minor incident was logged, its cause fixed, and that it did not happen again. A business that sends the wrong letter once has had an accident. A business that does it three times has a data quality problem, and that is a much harder position to describe as trivial — to a court, to a regulator, or to the people whose details were exposed.

From misdirected envelopes to the Supreme Court

The chronology below follows the case and the complaint figures around it. Where the record does not give a date, the entry says so rather than inventing one.

Undated — the statements go to old addresses

Paymaster (1836), trading as Equiniti, sends annual benefits statements for more than 400 Sussex Police officers to addresses they no longer lived at. The statements include dates of birth, National Insurance numbers, salary and pension details. No special category data is involved.

Undated — two further occasions on record

Minutes from the Sussex Police Pension Board show two other separate occasions on which annual benefits statements were sent to the wrong address. Three incidents of the same type point towards a systemic failure in address management rather than an isolated slip.

February 2024 — the High Court strikes out most claims

The High Court strikes out most of the officers’ claims because they cannot prove the envelopes were opened or that their data was misused. On this approach, a misdirected letter that nobody can show was read gives rise to very little.

Later — the Court of Appeal reverses course

The Court of Appeal rules that the officers can still claim damages for the breach itself if they can show they were harmed, even without proven misuse. The question moves from whether someone read the data to whether the claimants were harmed by its exposure — a materially lower bar for claimants.

2024/25 — 42,300 complaints

The UK’s data protection watchdog, the Information Commission, receives 42,300 data protection complaints over the year.

2025/26 — more than 76,700

Complaints rise to more than 76,700 — an increase of about 81% in a single year. Addleshaw Goddard’s James Hyde says organisations are being inundated with trivial claims, partly fuelled by claimants using AI to generate them.

7 – 8 October 2026 — the Supreme Court hears the appeal

A two–day hearing on whether claimants must show a threshold of seriousness. Equiniti argues the breach was trivial and one–off; the claimants, backed by the Open Rights Group and the Information Commission, argue a threshold would be inconsistent with GDPR and would block mass harm claims.

Ahead — judgment

The court’s decision will set the approach for low–value data protection claims across the UK. Until it is handed down, businesses should plan on the basis of the current position: claims for the breach itself may proceed where harm can be shown, without proof of misuse.

The two undated entries at the top are, for most businesses, the most relevant part of the story. The legal argument is about how courts should treat minor breaches. The operational lesson is about how minor breaches become repeated ones: an address that should have been updated was not, and the same failure recurred. That is a data quality problem before it is a legal one, and it is entirely within an organisation’s own control.

Where minor data breaches actually come from

The chart below is an indicative planning model — not survey data — giving a relative sense of how often different kinds of minor breach arise in a typical UK SME. Its purpose is to show the shape of the problem, which is very different from the one most security spending is aimed at.

Email sent to the wrong recipient, often via autocomplete

88%

Post or documents sent to an outdated address

71%

Wrong attachment sent to the right person

66%

Recipient list exposed by using To or Cc instead of Bcc

58%

Shared link left open to anyone with the URL

52%

Lost or stolen device without encryption

34%

External cyber attack

27%

The point of the ordering is that the most common breaches are procedural, not technical. The Farley case sits in the second row: a correct document sent to an incorrect address because a record was out of date. None of the top five involves an attacker. They involve a person, a system that made the mistake easy, and a record nobody had checked. That matters for where effort should go, because a business that spends its data protection budget on threat detection and nothing on address hygiene, recipient checks or link permissions has defended against the less frequent problem.

It also explains why the AI–fuelled claims Hyde describes are a particular concern for this category. A misdirected letter or email is easy to describe, easy to evidence from the recipient’s side, and easy to turn into a templated claim. If generating such claims has become cheap, the volume of claims arising from exactly these everyday errors is the volume most likely to rise — which is consistent with the complaint figures, though the published numbers do not by themselves establish the cause.

The 90% figure, and two ways to read it

Equiniti’s most concrete piece of evidence on distress is a take–up rate.

More than 90% of the affected officers did not sign up for the free fraud prevention service Equiniti offered them, according to the company — which it presents as evidence that the breach cannot have caused genuine distress

Equiniti’s reading is straightforward: people who are genuinely worried about fraud take up a free service designed to protect them against it, and nine in ten did not. On that view the low take–up is direct evidence that the incident was experienced as minor, which supports the argument that it should not found a compensation claim.

The opposing reading is also available, and it is the kind of argument the court will weigh rather than one we can resolve. Take–up of an offered service measures many things besides distress — whether people noticed the offer, trusted the organisation that had just mishandled their data to handle more of it, had time to act, or believed a fraud alert service would help with the specific risk. Distress and administrative follow–through are not the same quantity. The figure is genuinely relevant evidence; what it proves is the contested part.

For businesses, the transferable point is about what happens after a breach rather than about the legal argument. Offering affected people a concrete remedy — a monitoring service, a clear explanation, a named contact — is good practice regardless of whether they use it, and the existence of the offer became part of the evidential record here. An organisation that responds to a minor breach promptly, transparently and with something useful is in a stronger position, legally and reputationally, than one that says nothing because the incident seemed small.

Where UK businesses are exposed

The rows below reflect where minor–breach exposure typically sits in a UK SME, with badges indicating how much attention each usually needs. The theme is that the costly failures are repeated ordinary ones.

Minor–breach and data quality exposure in a typical UK business

Customer, employee or member contact records not refreshed on any schedule High

No process for acting on returned or undeliverable post and bounced email High

Minor incidents not logged, so repeats of the same failure are never recognised High

No safeguards against misdirected email — autocomplete, external recipient warnings High

Suppliers handling your people’s data — payroll, pensions, benefits — with no data accuracy obligations in the contract Mid

Complaints and subject access requests handled ad hoc, with no documented process Mid

No standard response to an affected individual after a minor breach Mid

No reporting that would show whether complaint volumes are rising Low

The first two rows are the Farley case in miniature. Address data decays: people move, change email providers, leave employment. A record that was accurate when entered becomes wrong without anyone touching it, and the error only surfaces when something sensitive is sent to it. Most businesses already receive the signal that a record is stale — returned post, a bounced email, a delivery failure — and simply do not route it back to the record. Closing that loop is a small process change and an unglamorous piece of data management, and it addresses the exact failure behind this case.

The fifth row deserves attention because it describes Farley’s structure precisely. The data belonged to Sussex Police officers; the mistake was made by a pension administrator acting for the force. Many UK businesses outsource payroll, pensions, benefits or HR administration, and the contract often says a great deal about service levels and very little about the accuracy of the personal data the supplier holds or how quickly it acts on changes. If your supplier misdirects your employees’ data, the people affected are yours, and so is the reputational consequence.

What getting this right costs

The bands below are indicative planning figures for UK businesses improving data accuracy and minor–incident handling — not quotes, and not a substitute for legal advice on any specific claim.

Business profile	Typical scope	Indicative cost	What you get for it
Small business, a few hundred customer or staff records	A simple incident log, returned–mail and bounce handling routed back to records, external recipient warnings switched on in email	£0 – £800	Evidence that minor incidents are recorded and fixed, and the most common misdirection routes narrowed
Business with thousands of customer records	Data quality review of contact records, scheduled refresh, duplicate and stale record detection, reporting on undeliverable rates	£2,000 – £9,000	Contact data you can trust before you send something sensitive to it, and early warning when it degrades
Business outsourcing payroll, pensions or HR administration	Contract review for data accuracy and change–handling obligations, incident notification terms, periodic assurance from the supplier	£1,500 – £6,000	Clarity on who keeps your people’s details current, and how fast you hear when something goes to the wrong place
Organisation facing rising complaint or request volumes	Documented complaint and subject access workflow, templated responses, tracking and reporting, triage for templated or bulk claims	£4,000 – £18,000	Consistent, defensible handling that keeps the time cost of each low–level claim proportionate
Any business, immediately	Review the last two years of minor incidents for repeats of the same type, and record what was done about each	£0	The answer to the question that undercuts a “one–off” defence: has this happened before?

The final row is free and it should be done first. The single most important fact in Farley for an ordinary business is that the record showed two earlier misdirections. A business that looks at its own history and finds the same small failure recurring has found its real exposure — regardless of where the Supreme Court sets the bar — and has found it in time to fix it.

Two ways to handle the small stuff

Reactive posture

What most UK businesses do with minor breaches

Minor incidents fixed informally and never written down, because each one seemed too small to record
Returned post and bounced emails discarded rather than used to correct the record
Contact data trusted indefinitely once entered, with no refresh cycle
Outsourced administrators assumed to keep records current, with nothing in the contract requiring it
Affected individuals not contacted after a small breach, on the basis that it did not seem serious
Complaints and requests handled by whoever receives them, differently each time
Legal developments like this one treated as relevant only to large organisations

Proactive posture

Where virtual CIO oversight with Cloudswitched takes you

Every incident logged with its cause and fix, so a repeat is spotted the second time rather than the third
Undeliverable signals routed back to correct the underlying record automatically
Contact data refreshed on a schedule, with reporting that shows when quality is slipping
Data accuracy and change–handling written into contracts with payroll, pension and HR suppliers
A standard, prompt and honest response to affected individuals, with a concrete remedy where appropriate
A documented complaint and request workflow that keeps handling consistent and proportionate
The ruling tracked, and the approach adjusted once the law is settled

Nothing in the right–hand column depends on how the Supreme Court rules. If a threshold arrives, a business that logs and fixes minor incidents will find it far easier to show that an incident was genuinely trivial and genuinely isolated. If no threshold arrives, the same business will face fewer repeat incidents, handle the resulting claims more cheaply, and present a better account of itself when they arrive. The work is the same either way, which is the strongest argument for doing it now rather than waiting for the judgment.

Indicative readiness, out of 100, for a typical UK SME to show that a minor data protection incident was genuinely isolated — assessed on incident logging, contact data accuracy, supplier obligations and the consistency of complaint handling

The repeat test — an hour with your own history

Gather whatever record exists of data protection incidents over the past two years — a formal log if you have one, otherwise emails, helpdesk tickets and the recollection of whoever handles complaints. List each incident in a single line: what happened, what kind of failure it was, what was done about it. Then sort by type and look for repeats. Two misdirected emails to clients with similar names. Several letters returned from the same out–of–date addresses. More than one spreadsheet sent externally with a hidden tab containing personal data. Each of those, once, is an accident. Repeated, each is a process failure with an obvious fix — an external–recipient warning, a returned–mail procedure, a rule about sending spreadsheets. If you cannot do this exercise because nothing was written down, that is the finding: start a log today, even a one–line spreadsheet, because the next time someone describes your incident as one–off, you will want to be able to prove it.

What each outcome would mean for a business

The judgment is not yet known, and it would be wrong to predict it. It is possible, though, to set out what each broad outcome would mean in practice, because businesses will need to adjust in either case.

If the court introduces a seriousness threshold, claims arising from minor, isolated incidents with little evident harm would become easier to dispose of early. That would reduce the cost of handling the kind of templated, low–value claims Addleshaw Goddard’s James Hyde describes. It would not remove the obligation to protect personal data, would not affect the Information Commission’s regulatory powers, and would not help a business whose incident is serious or whose minor incidents form a pattern. The practical benefit would flow mostly to organisations that can demonstrate that an incident was trivial and isolated — which requires records.

If the court declines to introduce a threshold, the Court of Appeal’s approach would broadly stand: people could claim for the breach itself where they can show harm, even without proof of misuse. Low–value claims would remain viable, and if the volume of AI–assisted claims continues to grow, the time and money spent responding to them would grow too. In that world the economics push hard towards prevention and efficient handling — fewer incidents, better records, and a consistent, proportionate response process that does not consume senior time for every letter.

Either way, mass harm is the scenario to plan for. The claimants’ central concern, backed by the Information Commission, is the breach that affects thousands of people slightly. That is also the scenario with the largest aggregate exposure for a business: a single mailing to an out–of–date list, a single misconfigured export, a single misdirected bulk email. The individual harm may be small, but the number of potential claimants scales with the size of your database. The protections are the same ones discussed throughout this article — accurate records, checks before bulk sends, and incident handling that is fast, honest and documented.

The broader context is the surge in complaint volumes. A rise from 42,300 to more than 76,700 in a single year is large enough to change how organisations should resource this area regardless of the legal outcome. Whether the drivers are greater public awareness, easier tools for raising complaints, AI–generated claims as Hyde suggests, or some combination, the practical effect on a business is the same: more correspondence about personal data, each item needing a response that is accurate and consistent. That is a process and resourcing question as much as a legal one, and it is the kind of operational decision a virtual CIO engagement exists to surface before it becomes a backlog.

The story at a glance

Item	Detail
The case	Farley v Paymaster (1836), heard by the UK Supreme Court on 7–8 October 2026
The question	Whether claimants must show a “threshold of seriousness” before pursuing compensation for a data protection breach
The claimants	More than 400 current and former Sussex Police officers
The defendant	Paymaster (1836), trading as Equiniti, the force’s pension administrator
What happened	Annual benefits statements sent to old addresses, exposing dates of birth, National Insurance numbers, salary and pension details
Special category data	None involved
High Court, February 2024	Struck out most claims because the officers could not prove the envelopes were opened or their data misused
Court of Appeal	Ruled the officers could claim damages for the breach itself if they could show harm, even without proven misuse
Equiniti’s position	A “trivial, one–off breach” that “cannot have given rise to genuine feelings of distress”; over 90% did not take up its free fraud prevention service
Claimants’ position	Backed by the Open Rights Group and the Information Commission: a threshold would be inconsistent with GDPR and block legitimate mass harm claims
The pattern	Sussex Police Pension Board minutes record two other occasions statements went to the wrong address, suggesting a systemic failure
Complaint volumes	42,300 in 2024/25 rising to more than 76,700 in 2025/26 — about 81% higher
Industry view	Addleshaw Goddard’s James Hyde: organisations “inundated with trivial data privacy related claims”, partly AI–fuelled, “a significant drain on business time and money”
Outcome	Not yet known — judgment to follow
What protects a business either way	Accurate contact data, a log of minor incidents and their fixes, and consistent handling of complaints and affected individuals
Free first step	Review two years of minor incidents for repeats of the same failure — and start a log if none exists

This story connects to several we have covered recently. The ASOS push–notification breach is the clearest current example of names and contact details being treated as low–sensitivity data, and of why that classification understates what can follow. TikTok’s £12.7m fine shows the regulatory side of the same system, where the regulator rather than individuals brings the case — and illustrates how long the gap between a failure and its consequence can be. The reporting on UK police data held on Microsoft Azure is another case in which police personal data and an outsourced provider meet, and in which a risk accepted once was never revisited. OpenAI notifying 100–plus organisations about its agents makes the point that being able to establish what actually happened depends on records kept beforehand. And the actively exploited Citrix NetScaler flaws share the same lesson about logging: an incident you cannot reconstruct is one you cannot describe as minor.

Could you prove your last data slip–up was a one–off?

Whatever the Supreme Court decides, the businesses that come through low–value data protection claims well will be the ones with records: a log of incidents and fixes, contact data that is kept current, suppliers contractually obliged to do the same, and a consistent way of responding to the people affected. Cloudswitched’s virtual CIO service helps UK businesses put that foundation in place and size the operational response to rising complaint volumes — the kind of decision that rarely feels urgent until a backlog of claims arrives.

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Frequently asked questions

Has the Supreme Court decided the case?

No. The court heard argument over two days, on 7 and 8 October 2026, and judgment will follow later. Until it is handed down, the position established by the Court of Appeal is the one businesses should plan around: people can claim damages for a data protection breach itself if they can show they were harmed, even without proving their data was actually misused. It would be a mistake to assume a threshold is coming and relax incident handling in anticipation — and equally a mistake to assume the opposite. The sensible course is to do the work that helps under either outcome: accurate records, a log of incidents and fixes, and consistent handling.

What exactly is a “threshold of seriousness”?

In general terms, it is a requirement that the consequences of a breach reach some minimum level of significance before compensation can be claimed — so that very minor incidents, causing little or no real harm, are filtered out at an early stage. The Supreme Court is deciding whether UK data protection law imposes such a requirement. Equiniti argues it should apply to cases like this one, which it describes as a trivial, one–off breach. The claimants, supported by the Open Rights Group and the Information Commission, argue that it would be inconsistent with GDPR and would block legitimate claims in mass harm cases. We would not attempt to predict where the court will land.

Why would the regulator support the claimants?

The Information Commission’s position, alongside the Open Rights Group, is that a seriousness threshold would be inconsistent with GDPR and would block legitimate claims where a breach affects thousands of people and each person’s individual loss is small. The concern is that without a viable route for such claims, an organisation that exposes the data of a very large number of people, each a little, faces no meaningful private consequence. It is notable because the regulator is effectively arguing against a measure that would reduce the number of claims businesses face, which signals that it does not see fewer private claims as the right response to rising complaint volumes.

Is it really true that AI is driving more claims?

It is the view of Addleshaw Goddard disputes partner James Hyde, who says organisations are being inundated with trivial data privacy claims from individuals and claimant firm groups, partly fuelled by claimants using AI to generate them. The complaint figures are consistent with rising volume — from 42,300 in 2024/25 to more than 76,700 in 2025/26 at the Information Commission — but those figures alone do not establish what is driving the increase. Greater awareness and easier routes to complain may also contribute. For a business the cause matters less than the effect: more correspondence about personal data, each piece needing an accurate and consistent response.

We only hold names and addresses. Should we worry about this?

The Farley case involved no special category data at all — it was dates of birth, National Insurance numbers, salaries and pension details sent to old addresses — and it has reached the Supreme Court. Ordinary personal data is still personal data, and a claim does not require the information to be especially sensitive. The more useful question is how your business would describe and handle a small incident if one happened: whether you would know about it, log it, fix the cause, contact the people affected and be able to show it was isolated. Those capabilities matter more than the category of data you hold.

Does it matter whether the envelopes were actually opened?

That was the High Court’s focus in February 2024, when it struck out most claims because the officers could not prove the envelopes were opened or their data misused. The Court of Appeal moved the question on, ruling that the officers could claim for the breach itself if they could show they were harmed, even without proven misuse. That is the issue now before the Supreme Court. For businesses, the practical implication is that “nobody can prove anyone read it” is not currently a reliable defence on its own — which is another reason to prevent misdirection in the first place rather than relying on its consequences being invisible.

Why do the Pension Board minutes matter so much?

Because they bear directly on Equiniti’s description of the incident as one–off. The minutes show two other separate occasions on which annual benefits statements were sent to the wrong address, which suggests a systemic rather than isolated failure in address management. Whatever the legal significance the court attaches to that, the business lesson is clear. A single misdirected letter is an accident; the same failure three times points to a process that was not fixed. Any business hoping to rely on an incident being trivial and isolated needs to be able to demonstrate the isolated part, and that requires a record of what happened before.

We outsource payroll and pensions. Are we responsible for their mistakes?

Farley is a direct illustration of the arrangement: the data belonged to Sussex Police officers and the mistake was made by the pension administrator acting for the force. How responsibility is allocated legally depends on the specific roles and contracts involved, and you should take proper advice on your own position. Practically, though, the people affected are yours, and so is the damage to trust. Review your contracts with payroll, pension, benefits and HR suppliers for what they say about keeping personal data accurate, acting on changes of address, and telling you promptly when something goes to the wrong place. Many say very little.

What should we do when a minor breach happens?

Record it, fix the cause, and decide promptly how to treat the people affected. Logging matters because it lets you recognise repeats and later demonstrate that an incident was isolated. Fixing the cause matters because a minor failure repeated becomes a systemic one. And contacting affected people with a clear explanation and, where appropriate, something concrete — Equiniti offered a free fraud prevention service — is good practice that becomes part of the record either way. Some incidents may also need to be assessed for reporting to the regulator; take advice where you are unsure. Silence because an incident seemed small is the response most likely to be regretted later.

What is the single most useful thing to do this week?

Look back at your own incident history for repeats. Gather whatever record exists of data protection mistakes over the past two years — a formal log, emails, helpdesk tickets — and sort them by type. Repeated misdirected emails, repeatedly returned post, repeated over–sharing of spreadsheets: each pattern is a process failure with a straightforward fix. If you find nothing written down, start a simple log today. The most important detail in Farley for an ordinary business is that two earlier misdirections were on record, and the most useful protection is being able to show that your own minor incidents were recorded, fixed and not repeated.

The protection is the record, not the ruling

A seriousness threshold, if one arrives, will help organisations show that a small incident was genuinely small and genuinely isolated — and only those with the records to prove it. If no threshold arrives, the same records, the same accurate data and the same consistent handling will keep low–value claims manageable as volumes rise. Cloudswitched works with UK businesses on exactly that foundation: incident logging, contact data quality, supplier obligations and proportionate complaint handling, sized to your organisation and in place before the judgment rather than after it.

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